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ABSTRACT—A recent wave of scholarship argues that judges often fail to 
comply with binding rules or precedent and sometimes apply overturned 
laws. Scholars have hypothesized that the cause of this “judicial 
noncompliance” may be flawed litigant briefing that introduces mistakes into 
judicial decisions—an idea this Essay calls the “Litigant Hypothesis.” The 
Essay presents a preliminary study aimed at exploring ways of testing the 
validity of the Litigant Hypothesis. Employing an empirical analysis that 
exploits recent amendments to Federal Discovery Rule 26, this Essay finds 
that the strongest predictor of noncompliance in a dataset of discovery 
decisions is indeed faulty briefs. This study concludes that the Litigant 
Hypothesis of noncompliance may have explanatory value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A recent wave of scholarship argues that judges sometimes fail to 
comply with binding rules or precedents. Indeed, judges often ignore 
“unambiguous statutory command[s]” and “apply old, overturned laws 
instead of new laws.”1 In many ways, some judges act as if they do not care 
about legal changes or statutory obligations. For instance, in the past few 
years, we have seen federal courts dodge congressional overrides in the 
employment context;2 seemingly monumental changes to patent injunctions 
come to naught;3 and state and lower federal courts fail to comply with 
federal decisions on arbitration, class actions, and general jurisdiction.4 In all 
of these areas, judges failed to apply the law either consciously or by mistake. 
 
 1 See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & William H. J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with Mandatory 
Procedural Rules Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S87, S88 
(2015); Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 901 (2015) 
(describing judicial “overt noncompliance” as the “widespread and persistent judicial defiance of new 
doctrines”); see also Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 643, 646 (2015) (discussing the common misapplication of deference standards). 
 2 Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of 
Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 536–56 (2009) (describing judicial 
noncompliance with employment changes). 
 3 Tokson, supra note 1, at 940–44 (describing lower courts’ failure to comply with the Supreme 
Court’s standard in eBay v. MercExchange, LLC). 
 4 See Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1805, 1833 
(2018) (discussing a “ tug-of-war” between the Supreme Court and state courts over changes to class 
action lit igation). 
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The stakes of this judicial noncompliance are high. Noncompliance 
challenges the basic principle of judicial enforcement: that courts will 
faithfully apply binding rules and statutes.5 Under a “perfect-agent” account, 
courts have perfect information and faithfully comply with legal rules, 
statutes, and mandates.6 The faithful judge promotes predictability, equal 
treatment, fairness, and uniformity across the judiciary—values essential to 
a functioning legal system.7 Without a faithful judge, the system can become 
volatile. Judicial errors and resulting noncompliant decisions may become 
embedded in the common law, undermining statutory and enforcement 
regimes and leading to distorted legal outcomes.8 Even more generally, when 
judicial noncompliance—intentionally or by mistake—occurs, “the 
evolution of doctrine is being driven by something that most observers would 
agree has nothing to do with the normatively correct outcomes.”9 Judicial 
mistakes and noncompliance simply lead to suboptimal decisions. 
Recent literature has highlighted the prevalence of noncompliance and 
suggested a variety of underlying causes, including overloaded judicial 
dockets;10 judges’ cognitive or heuristic limitations;11 judges’ limited 
knowledge of rules;12 judicial disagreement with legal precedent;13 and even 
policy experimentation or, as some have called it, “narrowing from below.”14 
Most of these scholars have derived their theories from two models of 
judging. First, the “Labor Market” model posits that judges respond to the 
same institutional pressures as other workers.15 Judges have superiors 
(appellate courts), customers (litigants), and dynamic incentives (e.g., 
possibility of elevation to a higher court). Under this model, noncompliance 
may simply be a consequence of institutional labor arrangements, laziness, 
 
 5 Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S91. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2 
(2015) (listing legal predictability and fairness as core values of the federal judiciary). 
 8 Masur and Ouellette, supra note 1, at 725. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Bert Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2011) (presenting evidence of a 
link between higher docket loads and increasing circuit  court deference to district court decisions). 
 11 Tokson, supra note 1, at 914. 
 12 Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S93. 
 13 Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
817, 818–19 (1994). 
 14 Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 924 (2016) 
(arguing that although lower courts are supposed to apply Supreme Court precedent, “they often don’t. 
Instead . . . lower courts often adopt narrower readings”). 
 15 See generally Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). 
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and judges’ search for leisure time.16 Second, the “Cognitive Costs” model 
of judicial behavior argues that judicial noncompliance may stem from 
cognitive forces like status quo bias, the power of habit, and heuristics.17 
Bounded human rationality, in short, may produce predictable “mistakes” 
that shape judicial noncompliance with statutes, rules, and the common 
law.18 
But unlike these two models, a subset of scholars has noted that it may 
be litigants who are introducing faulty law into the process.19 This hypothesis 
of noncompliance posits that litigant briefs may contain legal errors that 
judges inadvertently incorporate in their decisions—and those decisions, in 
turn, may be adopted by other courts as precedent. For example, Abbe Gluck 
suggested that in the context of federal court citations to outdated state cases, 
“[t]hese citation choices are likely due to errors by law clerks or lawyers or 
to the tendency of courts to rely on the same (sometimes outdated) set of 
boilerplate precedents from case to case.”20 Jonathan Masur and Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette wondered whether litigants’ faulty briefs might be 
responsible for judicial misapplication of standards of review.21 This 
“Litigant Hypothesis” is compatible with the Labor Market and Cognitive 
Costs models—all three are just related elements of a simple judicial welfare 
function. But the Litigant Hypothesis emphasizes the relationship between 
litigant labor and judicial compliance. The Hypothesis also applies only to 
situations where it is apparent that a judge has made a mistake, rather than a 
conscious decision to defy a rule or statute.22 
The Litigant Hypothesis is a powerful explanation for the prevalence of 
mistaken noncompliance. Such a hypothesis calls for a rigorous test that has, 
thus far, eluded scholars.23 This isn’t to say that the links between litigant 
 
 16 See id. at 20 (describing a process in which judges will agree with a strongly opinionated judge on 
their panel to increase their leisure time). 
 17 See Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 3 (2006); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 
(2001); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Moral 
Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531 (2005). 
 18 See Tokson, supra note 1, at 922 (defining “mistakes” as situations where lower courts continue 
to apply overturned doctrine without realizing it). 
 19 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie 
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1933–34 (2011); Masur & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 666. 
 20 Gluck, supra note 19, at 1933–34. 
 21 Masur & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 666. 
 22 The bulk of the Essay is devoted to these “mistake” scenarios rather than deliberate 
noncompliance. 
 23 The only rigorous work has come from Todd Henderson and William Hubbard. See generally 
Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1. 
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behavior and noncompliance have gone entirely unnoticed. Some have 
attempted to evaluate this connection, focusing on proxies for litigation 
strategy and analyzing its connection to judicial decisions.24 But these 
attempts have not tested whether faulty legal rules or standards introduced 
in briefs lead to noncompliant decisions. 
This Essay presents a preliminary study that attempts to test the Litigant 
Hypothesis. This endeavor is not simple—observing a correlation between 
faulty briefs and noncompliant decisions requires a special situation. Indeed, 
it would take a rule change involving an area of law where it is sufficiently 
simple to measure judicial compliance, and the existence of litigant briefing 
on the relevant legal issue. 
Thankfully, such a scenario recently became available. On December 
1, 2015, a set of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came 
into effect.25 Specifically, for our purposes, the new version of Discovery 
Rule 26 introduced two important, but discrete, textual changes to discovery: 
(1) it transplanted a series of discovery-limiting factors from Rule 26(b)(2) 
to 26(b)(1), providing that the scope of discovery extends only to information 
“proportional” to the needs of the case, and (2) it discarded a sentence that 
allowed discovery requests “reasonably calculated” to lead to relevant 
information.26 The amendments constituted a substantive change that cut in 
the direction of less discovery. Because a large percentage of cases need 
discovery, the rules immediately changed the civil litigation landscape. The 
addition of one key word and the elimination of one phrase lend themselves 
nicely to a textual analysis of decisions and briefs. In addition, almost a year 
after these changes came into effect, Judge Campbell, the chair of the 
committee that drafted the rules, noted in a discovery decision that “[d]espite 
this clear change, many courts continue to use the phrase [‘reasonably 
calculated’]. Old habits die hard.”27 With that pithy note, the amendments set 
in place straightforward textual changes, the possibility of litigation 
involving those changes (with attendant briefs), and the apparent existence 
of judicial noncompliance. 
The simplicity and transparency of this legal setting is almost tailor-
made for empirical analysis. A study of noncompliant decisions and the 
briefs filed in those cases would elucidate whether the Litigant Hypothesis 
 
 24 See, e.g., Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S97–100. 
 25 Supreme Court of the United States, Order of April 29, 2015, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ5C-ZZMZ]. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach & 
Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093 
(2016) (discussing the “key economic aspects of beefing up the proportionality standard in discovery”). 
 26 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 27 In re Bard IVC Filters Prod. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016). 
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has explanatory value—Are faulty briefs correlated with judicial errors? Part 
II delineates the study parameters, but the methodology is so straightforward 
that it is worth briefly sketching here. 
At the outset, if a discovery motion is brought after December 1, 2015, 
then any decisions or briefs that apply the new “proportionality” standard 
and do not mention the “reasonably calculated” language when describing 
Rule 26 can be coded as “compliant.” By contrast, any orders that apply the 
obsolete “reasonably calculated” language or quote the pre-proportionality 
rule as good law are “noncompliant.” Then, a systematic comparison of 
docket records, decisions, and briefs in both compliant and noncompliant 
cases would allow us to observe if noncompliant briefs are correlated with 
noncompliant decisions. 
With the above approach in mind, I assembled and analyzed an original 
dataset of docket records, briefs, and discovery orders in a sample of 157 
published discovery decisions decided in 2016—out of a universe of around 
1000 published decisions. In order to fully isolate the effects of the Litigant 
Hypothesis, I tested competing variables based on the Labor Market and 
Cognitive Costs models that could also account for noncompliance in the 
discovery context, including: judges’ seniority, docket constraints, time 
since the reforms, and differential expertise (magistrate vs. district judges). 
While it would be too hasty to make sweeping conclusions on the basis of 
this analysis, the Essay presents some preliminary findings. 
First, the Essay finds that judges have substantially complied with the 
rule—more than 93% of published discovery decisions in 2016 mentioned 
the new proportionality standard.28 Despite this degree of compliance, the 
Essay also finds that in more than seventy-one decisions, representing 
approximately 7% of published discovery decisions, judges used the pre-
amendment standards as if no change had been made. In short, they ignored 
governing law and applied obsolete standards. The number of noncompliant 
decisions presents fertile ground to evaluate the Litigant Hypothesis. 
Second, delving into 157 noncompliant and compliant decisions, the 
Essay finds an important correlation between judicial compliance and 
litigant brief compliance. A regression analysis confirms the statistically 
significant relationship between compliant briefs and compliant decisions 
and noncompliant briefs and noncompliant decisions.29 Based on this, the 
Essay argues that the Litigant Hypothesis may have explanatory value. But 
the correlation is complicated and highlights important limitations in the 
study. In decisions with noncompliant briefs, 89% of judges nonetheless 
 
 28 See infra Part III. The vast majority of these decisions also ignored the defunct “reasonably 
calculated” phrase. But around 100 decisions (<10%) continued to use this outdated phrase. 
 29 Id. 
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complied with the new standard. The fact that the vast majority of judges 
complied regardless of the briefs casts doubt on the validity of the Litigant 
Hypothesis. But the Essay also finds that a compliant brief is correlated with 
an increase in compliance rates from 88% to 97% of decisions (or, in other 
words, compliant briefs were associated with a reduction in noncompliant 
decisions from 12% of cases to only 3%). This indicates that briefs may have 
a limited effect because most judges are complying regardless—but 
submitting a compliant brief is associated with an increase in the probability 
of a compliant decision.30 It is unclear, however, whether these findings 
apply to other legal areas or are context-dependent (specific to discovery 
cases). 
Third, the Essay finds that discovery decisions assigned to magistrate 
judges rather than district judges were more likely to be compliant. This may 
indicate that, for reasons discussed below, magistrate judges had greater 
awareness of the new rule and complied at higher rates. 
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the literature on judicial 
noncompliance and introduces the Litigant Hypothesis. Part II discusses 
recent discovery reforms and lays out the Essay’s research design. Part III 
employs empirical methods to analyze a recent trend in Rule 26 decisions 
that ignore new amendments to the rule. Finally, Part IV discusses the 
findings and introduces future avenues of research. 
I. BACKGROUND: ACCOUNTS OF JUDICIAL NONCOMPLIANCE 
This Part explores the recent scholarly accounts that have developed to 
explain judicial noncompliance. Section I.A discusses the Labor Market 
account of noncompliance; Section I.B discusses the Cognitive Costs account 
of noncompliance; and, finally, Section I.C introduces the Litigant 
Hypothesis. 
A. The Labor Market Account of Noncompliance 
The Labor Market account of judging posits that judges respond to the 
same pressures as other workers. They are employed by institutions with, 
among other things, superiors (appellate courts), customers (litigants), and 
dynamic incentives (e.g., possibility of elevation to a higher court).31 Like 
other workers, judges express a preference for greater leisure time.32 As a 
result, judges are not perfect agents and instead exhibit predictable flaws in 
 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Posner, supra note 15, at 1. 
 32 Id. at 11. 
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their enforcement of the law that can change substantive legal outcomes.33 
The Labor Market account predicts that judges may distort legal doctrines in 
order to maximize leisure.34 For example, Epstein, Landes, and Posner argue 
that leisure preferences may push a judge to limit judicial workloads by 
embracing “rules in lieu of standards, deferential standards of appellate 
review, plea bargaining, and, above all, the requirements of standing.”35 
These doctrines may be antithetical to traditional conceptions of judging in 
the sense that the judge is not applying the doctrines because precedent 
mandates them. Instead, judges overuse these doctrines to limit their 
workload and enhance leisure time. The primary message of the labor market 
account is that judicial decisions are predictably “flawed” because of 
dynamic labor market incentives. 
Evaluating this account empirically, Todd Henderson and William 
Hubbard have shown that district court judges have ignored wholesale a 
statutory command in the securities context.36 Specifically, Henderson and 
Hubbard found that instead of applying a specific mandate under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)—that judges make on-
the-record findings that the litigants complied with Rule 11—judges ignored 
the rule when lawyers did not demand compliance themselves.37 The rate of 
compliance was remarkably small—the authors observed “on-the-record 
findings regarding Rule 11 compliance in less than 14 percent of all cases.”38 
Many factors influenced this overt judicial noncompliance, including (1) 
limited knowledge by uninformed judges who apparently were learning over 
time;39 (2) judicial inertia by judges who preferred to apply pre-PSLRA 
standards; and (3) litigant behavior.40 Henderson and Hubbard noted that 
“judges must dispose of hundreds of cases per year and thus cannot devote 
perfect attention to the legal details of any given case.”41 
Ultimately, the authors concluded that judges behave like any other 
worker: they “learn over time, prefer leisure to labor, and respond to 
 
 33 LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: 
A T HEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 25 (2013). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 39. 
 36 See Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S100. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at  S90. 
 39 Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 290 (2016) (proposing a theory 
called “ judicial learning over time,” which the author describes as a process where judges misapply 
sentences because they are consistently exposed to incorrect information over time). 
 40 Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S97. 
 41 Id. at S94. 
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incentives created by supervisors and others in their environment.”42 In the 
context of the PSLRA, judges “do not routinely comply” with statutory 
mandates.43 
B. The Cognitive Costs Account of Noncompliance 
Another line of scholarship argues that cognitive forces may influence 
judicial rejection of costly legal changes.44 This model begins with the 
observation that when making complex decisions, bounded human 
rationality can litter the process with unseen biases.45 These biases intensify 
when judges have limited time and information, forcing them to rely on 
subconscious rules of thumb. In these circumstances, judges may suffer from 
the shortcomings of heuristics, anchoring bias, status quo bias, and the power 
of habit, among other cognitive forces.46 Many operate at a subconscious 
level but nonetheless influence substantive outcomes. 
Take, for instance, the effects of status quo bias. Matthew Tokson and 
others have identified the tendency for judges to grow accustomed to 
doctrines they apply on a routine basis, to the point that “doing so becomes 
almost automatic over time.”47 Once this process sets in motion, any changes 
to the doctrine—small or large—are subconsciously seen as “departures.”48 
The more familiar a doctrine is, the stronger the preference to retain it. In 
time, other cognitive effects may come along for the ride. For example, with 
justification bias, judges may convince themselves that the doctrines they are 
applying are fair and justifiable.49 As a result, judges may ignore new rules 
or binding precedent. 
In line with this reasoning, Tokson has argued that a slew of recent legal 
changes have produced predictable and consistent judicial resistance and 
reversion to overturned doctrines.50 Indeed, Tokson makes the case that the 
combination of cognitive biases, including status quo and justification 
 
 42 Id. at  S87. 
 43 Id. at  S89. 
 44 See supra note 17. 
 45 See Guthrie, supra note 17, at 787; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17. 
 46 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961, 1986 (2007) (citing Guthrie, supra note 17, at 787–816) (discussing the literature on bounded 
rationality in the context of procedure and explaining, among other things, that “anchoring bias refers to 
the tendency to use a known fact to anchor estimates of an unknown, and the result is that estimates tend 
to be lower when the anchor is lower and higher when the anchor is higher”); Korobkin & Ulen, supra 
note 17, at 1075 (discussing the factors that influence the unconscious use of heuristics and other cognitive 
biases). 
 47 Tokson, supra note 1, at 916. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See id. at  930. 
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biases, may result in situations where “[d]efunct doctrines, abolished and 
replaced by new laws, appear to rise from their graves and walk the earth 
again, influencing judges much as they did before being overturned.”51 
Tokson notes that this is most likely to occur when legal changes (1) increase 
costs (time, effort, and cognitive workload), (2) activate a judges’ preference 
for familiar doctrines, and (3) operate under a low probability of appellate 
review.52 
Bert Huang has also analyzed whether increased caseloads affected the 
outcomes of courts of appeals cases.53 Focusing specifically on a flood of 
immigration cases into two circuits, Huang found that these swamped 
circuits did indeed reverse district court rulings less often in unrelated civil 
cases.54 The best explanation for this outcome, Huang argued, was that in 
order to manage the vast docket increase, judges were ignoring many 
appeals. This finding supports the Cognitive Costs model’s prediction that 
congested dockets might lead to higher cognitive strain and resulting error. 
Summing up the logic, Huang cites Judge Harry Edwards, who once quipped 
that “the bigger the dockets, the less time we spend on the difficult cases and 
the more mistakes we make.”55 
The Labor Market and Cognitive Costs accounts do not provide a 
baseline for rates of noncompliance, but they do identify influential variables 
and even suggest that noncompliance is commonplace. These two accounts 
emphasize that judicial compliance with binding precedent is influenced by 
dynamic incentives and cognitive forces. 
C. The Litigant Hypothesis of Noncompliance 
This Essay aims to supplement the Labor Market and Cognitive Costs 
models with an account of judicial noncompliance that highlights the 
possibility of flawed briefs. The fundamental premise of the Litigant 
Hypothesis is that litigants’ briefs are one of the most important judicial 
information inputs. Hence, to the extent briefs may contain errors of law, 
they should predictably affect the quality of judicial output. 
The Litigant Hypothesis is rooted in the recognition that judges have 
severely limited information sources. Indeed, the asymmetry of information 
 
 51 Id. at  965. 
 52 Id. at 967. 
 53 Huang, supra note 10, at 1110; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE 
AND REFORM 350 (1996). 
 54 Huang, supra note 10, at 1113. 
 55 Id. at  1116 (citing Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on 
Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 403 (1984)) (emphasis 
added). 
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inputs between the judiciary and other branches is striking. In any particular 
case, a federal judge is limited to information provided by the parties’ briefs, 
her clerk’s research, judicial conferences, continuing legal education, and the 
judge’s own reading of the case law or secondary sources. Courts have no 
independent information-gathering ability akin to congressional hearings, 
extensive agency fact-finding and empirical models, or support from the vast 
bureaucracy that underpins executive decision-making. Even more, within 
judges’ information portfolio, the most important sources are briefs, clerks, 
and the judge’s own career expertise.56 This dearth of information input has 
significant consequences. Without sound information, a judge is unlikely to 
arrive at a sound decision. 
The Litigant Hypothesis receives support from a variety of fields. For 
example, as administrative law scholars have long noted, “decisions depend 
on the information that underpins them.”57 Administrative law doctrines of 
judicial deference are partly based on recognition that agencies have 
specialized information and expertise that the judiciary cannot access.58 
Further fields like modern organizational theory emphasize not only the 
limits of expertise within organizations, but the central role that information 
processing plays in “organizational decision making.”59 This organizational 
literature, in short, stresses that “decisions ensue from narrow perspectives 
and distorted data.”60 More relevant for our purposes, in the context of 
procedure, Robert Bone has noted that “even if a judge is able to process 
information without cognitive bias, her choice of procedure is only as good 
as the information she receives,” especially from “the parties and their 
lawyers.”61 
These findings support the idea that in order to evaluate faults with 
judicial output—like the existence of noncompliance—we should focus on 
judges’ faulty information inputs. 
With the Litigant Hypothesis’s emphasis on an information-centered 
model, it is easy to observe that judicial noncompliance may be an outcome 
of distorted data input. The mistakes that lead to noncompliance can be 
introduced into the judicial process in simple ways. Imagine a situation 
 
 56 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 148 (1990) (“[M]ost judicial 
opinions are written by the judges’ law clerks rather than by the judges themselves.”). 
 57 Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 
3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254 (1987). 
 58 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2100 (1990). 
 59 See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Yair Sagy, Courts as Organizations: The Drive for Efficiency and 
the Regulation of Class Action Settlements, 4 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 20 (2016). 
 60 Id. (citing David J. Hickson, Decision-Making at the Top of the Organization, 13 ANN. REV. SOC. 
165, 171 (1987)). 
 61 See Bone, supra note 46, at 1990. 
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where a new statute or rule has been adopted in the past six months (giving 
the judge little time to learn about the new rule). The rule clarifies an existing 
doctrine that has been applied for decades. In drafting an opinion—perhaps 
at the motion to dismiss stage—the judge assigns one of her clerks to put 
together a first draft. In that process, the clerk may review the litigants’ briefs 
and her judge’s last opinion on the matter, especially if the question 
presented involves a common rule. Flawed briefs, however, may misdirect 
the clerk or confuse her research. The confusion may be compounded by the 
fact that legal databases do not indicate when a rule embedded in a prior 
decision has changed. If the clerk copies a segment of a prior decision that 
is, as a whole, good law, she may inadvertently incorporate bad law. 
Moreover, the clerk may base her draft on a template or excerpts of the 
parties’ briefs. The judge and co-clerks may then review the resulting draft 
opinion, but it may not undergo intense scrutiny, especially on certain 
questions of law. By the time of publication, the decision may include clear 
errors of law. 
Other scholars have noted that legal drafting errors can lead to a 
noncompliant judge. Jonathan Masur and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette have 
previously addressed the prevalence of judicial mistakes in various contexts, 
arguing that mistakes may result because “[a] sloppy judge (or clerk) might 
not read an opinion in full or might not attend to all the details and 
circumstances surrounding a holding.”62 Indeed, Masur and Larrimore 
Ouellette note that “judges lack the resources to carefully consider each of 
their citations,” and that the parties’ briefs may actually be the source of 
many errors.63 Similarly, Abbe Gluck has noted that in the context of federal 
court citations of outdated state cases, “[t]hese citation choices are likely due 
to errors by law clerks or lawyers or to the tendency of courts to rely on the 
same (sometimes outdated) set of boilerplate precedents from case to case, 
and we should assume that they are unintentional.”64 These are the basic 
building blocks of the Litigant Hypothesis: lawyers’ errors may lead to 
judicial errors.65 
The Litigant Hypothesis is compatible with the Labor Market and 
Cognitive Costs models. The core feature of the Litigant Hypothesis—that 
judges rely on information from lawyers that may contain inaccuracies—
even assumes the existence of other Labor Market and Cognitive constraints. 
While the Litigant Hypothesis is not a competing account of judicial 
 
 62 Masur & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 664. 
 63 Id. at  665. 
 64 Gluck, supra note 20, at 1933–34. 
 65 The lit igants’ motivations may also be important here. With certain rule changes, one side may be 
motivated to misstate the law. 
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behavior, it does emphasize a different source of errors that may influence 
noncompliance. The models of noncompliance outlined above and the 
Litigant Hypothesis produce a set of variables that may be predictive of or 
correlated with noncompliance, including the following: 
1. Time and Docket Constraints: Under the Cognitive Costs model, 
noncompliance may result from overloaded dockets because heuristics 
and cognitive errors are particularly salient when judges are overworked 
and underfunded. 
2. Learning Curve: Under the Labor Market model, we should expect 
judges to take their time to “learn” about rule changes. Noncompliance 
may therefore be a consequence of this learning process. 
3. The Quality of Litigants’ Briefs: Under the Litigant Hypothesis, the 
quality of the briefs may influence judicial compliance with statutory 
mandates or rule changes. 
4. Appellate Oversight: Both the Labor Market and Cognitive Costs models 
emphasize the disciplinary role of appellate oversight. Judges have 
reputational and employment incentives to avoid reversal. 
Noncompliance may therefore result in the absence of appellate 
oversight. 
5. Judicial Characteristics: Both the Labor Market and Cognitive Costs 
models also highlight the importance of other judicial characteristics like 
seniority status and length of tenure. Senior judges are more likely to 
seek leisure time and may comply less with recent legal changes. 
With this set of working variables, it is easy to see how an empirical 
test could improve our understanding of these models. In order to isolate the 
effects of briefs, however, an analysis has to account for the effect of the 
other four variables described above. 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN: DISCOVERY AND JUDICIAL NONCOMPLIANCE 
This Part outlines the research design, dataset, and methodology for 
testing the Litigant Hypothesis in the discovery context. In order to evaluate 
the possible correlation between faulty briefs and noncompliant decisions—
evidence for the Litigant Hypothesis—we would need a situation that 
satisfies the following: (1) a rule change involving an area of law where it is 
sufficiently straightforward to measure judicial compliance; and (2) litigant 
briefing on the relevant legal issue. Fortunately, recent changes to discovery 
rules provide a good test case. 
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A. Background: Discovery Reform 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 directly addresses the substantive 
scope of discovery in a civil case. For years, the definition of relevance for 
discovery purposes included requests “reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”66 In 2015, however, the Civil Rules’ 
Advisory Committee published amendments to Rule 26 that altered this 
language. First, the amendments redefined the scope of discovery to cover 
the following: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any parties’ claim or defense and proportional to 
the needs of the case.”67 In short, the alteration transplanted a proportionality 
analysis that was located in a different part of the rule with the goal of 
constraining the reach of discovery requests. Notably, the amendment also 
deleted any mention of the “reasonably calculated” relevance language. The 
Committee Notes explain the deletion: 
The former provision for discovery of relevant but inadmissible information  
that appears “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence” is also deleted. The phrase has been used by some, incorrectly, to 
define the scope of discovery. . . . The “reasonably calculated” phrase has 
continued to create problems, however, and is removed by these amendments.68 
The amendments as a whole cut in the direction of less discovery. This 
change became binding on federal courts per the Rules Enabling Act (REA) 
on December 1, 2015. The REA prescribes that any conflicting rules “shall 
be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”69 
Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) provides that any amendments to the rules 
apply to proceedings commenced after December 1, 2015, and proceedings 
then pending “insofar as just and practicable.”70 The binding nature of the 
new rules is crucial for the entire analysis. 
One caveat is important in this context. I am assuming for the purposes 
of this Essay that if a judge makes no finding that applying the new rule is 
impractical or unjust, then she must apply it. If this assumption is correct, 
then any discovery decision that applies the old rule without making such a 
finding is therefore noncompliant. 71 
 
 66 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (2000) (repealed 2015). 
 67 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (emphasis added). 
 68 Committee Notes on 2015 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/frcp/rule_26 [https://perma.cc/85RU-3V3H]. 
 69 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
 70 Supreme Court of the United States, Order of April 29, 2015, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ5C-ZZMZ]. 
 71 One possible concern is that in some of these decisions, the judge may have applied the old rules 
because the cases were filed prior to December 1, 2015. That is unlikely for three reasons. First, cases 
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With these premises in place, the discovery changes have the 
ingredients necessary for a successful empirical analysis. While in many 
areas of law, the existence of judicial compliance is subjective, in the Rule 
26 context, it is closer to an objective standard: judges are obligated to apply 
the new rule. The final element of the analysis came into place when Judge 
Campbell—the chair of the Advisory Committee that drafted the rule 
amendments—mentioned in a 2016 decision that judges were ignoring the 
rule changes.72 
With the possible existence of this scenario in mind, I conducted 
targeted searches in Westlaw for discovery decisions in the past five years. 
My main goal was to look for the existence of “noncompliant” decisions in 
2016. As mentioned above, testing for compliance in this context is relatively 
straightforward: for post-December 1, 2015 discovery motions, any 
decisions or orders that apply the new proportionality standard and do not 
mention the “reasonably calculated” language when describing Rule 26 can 
be coded as “compliant.” On the other hand, any orders that apply the 
“reasonably calculated” language or cite the pre-proportionality rule as good 
law can be coded as “noncompliant.” My initial findings using this 
rudimentary coding system and searches on Westlaw were surprising. 
Contrary to the most pessimistic expectations of judicial behavior, there has 
been substantial compliance with the new rule language. 
Figure 1 below shows a significant decline in the number of published 
decisions citing the “reasonably calculated” language without any mention 
of proportionality from an average of 963 a year for the past five years to 
around 151 in 2016. 73 
 
filed prior to the amendments’ effective date are considered “pending” and should still abide by the new 
rule unless the judge finds it  unjust and impracticable. Supreme Court of the United States, Order 
Regarding Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 29, 2015). Thus, any noncompliant 
judge should have found that it would be unjust to apply the new rules to an ongoing case. Cf. Stinson v. 
City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 4228 (RWS), 2016 WL 54684 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016) (explicitly finding 
that it  would be unjust to apply the new rules). I confirmed that none of the noncompliant decisions 
contained such a finding. Second, judges usually apply rule amendments to pending cases. Cf. Matthew 
Enter., Inc. v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 13-CV-04236-BLF, 2015 WL 8482256, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 
2015) (noting that “courts have held that it  is ‘just and practicable’ to apply the new rules in all cases as 
soon as they are promulgated”). Third, limiting the dataset to cases filed after December 1, 2015 still 
leaves seventeen cases with the same characteristics as in the wider universe. 
 72 In re Bard IVC Filters Prod. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016). 
 73 I arrived at this number by conducting broad searches on Westlaw for any mentions of the 
reasonably calculated language. I used the following search terms: adv: discovery /p “reasonably 
calculated” % propor!. My search is likely both underinclusive and overinclusive. 
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FIGURE 1: PUBLISHED DECISIONS CITING PRE-AMENDMENT STANDARD BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE DEC. 1, 2015 AMENDMENTS 
 
It is unclear whether this level of compliance is high as compared to 
other areas of law. But there are reasons to suspect that compliance is 
artificially inflated in this context. First, my initial searches measure only 
superficial compliance with the rule—the mere mention of the new Rule 26 
standard without the deleted language is sufficient to be compliant using this 
methodology. This measure is likely overinclusive because it includes 
decisions where judges recited the new rule but otherwise applied the 
previous discovery framework. Second, these searches only account for 
Westlaw-published decisions. One empirical study indicates that the vast 
majority of discovery orders are released without an explanatory decision. 74 
Bench orders—which are left out of this analysis—may have higher rates of 
noncompliance because the judge and clerk may not have conducted 
thorough legal research. 
 
 74 See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, 
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In any case, these searches left the possibility that in a large number of 
decisions, courts were still applying obsolete language—a paradigmatic 
example of judicial noncompliance. 
B. Dataset: Compliant and Noncompliant Decisions/Briefs 
In order to assemble the dataset, I first conducted targeted search terms 
for 2016 published decisions that mentioned the outdated “reasonably 
calculated” language and left out any mention of “proportionality” in the 
context of discovery.75 As previously mentioned, whether a case references 
these three words determines compliance and noncompliance. After hand-
coding the results, the dataset contained over 100 noncompliant decisions. 
Reviewing all of these decisions, I confirmed that the decisions failed to 
acknowledge the amendments and cited the defunct standards as if no 
changes had been made. Based on the docket numbers in each decision, I 
then collected a dataset of Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(PACER), including a complete, text-searchable set of docket records, briefs, 
and discovery orders for these cases.76 After reviewing more than 100 
decisions, motions, and sets of briefs, I eliminated those where a motion was 
filed prior to December 1, 2015, where there were a high number of 
discovery motions around the time the new standard came into effect, and 
where the discovery language was used only in reference to the previous rule 
(and not applied to the case at hand). Limiting the dataset this way left me 
with a total of seventy-one noncompliant decisions and its attendant set of 
briefs (usually three). 
The remaining number of decisions continuing to cite outdated 
language was lower than expected but still provided a solid opportunity to 
analyze the Litigant Hypothesis. Again, in each of these seventy-one 
decisions since December 1, 2015—when the new rule came into effect—
courts have continued to employ the now-defunct “reasonably calculated” 
phrase and have failed to mention the new proportionality language. In other 
words, in each of these decisions, courts applied the wrong standard and 
overtly failed to comply with the Rule 26 amendments. The degree of 
noncompliance varies. In some cases, courts cited the defunct language of 
 
 75 Search terms: adv: discovery /p “reasonably calculated” % propor! (1/1/2016-12/31/2016). 
 76 Docket records are directly available via Bloomberg Law, allowing targeted searches for specific 
case dockets. 
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Rule 26 in direct quotes;77 in others, the court cited prior decisions that had 
themselves cited the defunct “reasonably calculated” phrase.78 
In order to test the Litigant Hypothesis, I also assembled a set of 
compliant decisions and briefs as a comparison group. Starting from a 
universe of around 1000 possible compliant decisions,79 I collected a random 
sample of briefs submitted in eighty-six compliant decisions where the judge 
correctly applied the proportionality standards and did not use the 
“reasonably calculated” language.80 
As described further below, this data-gathering process left me with 157 
decisions—seventy-one noncompliant and eighty-six compliant decisions—
and the attendant briefs (over 300). I then coded these briefs by compliance: 
if any set of briefs related to a motion mentioned the new rule, I coded them 
as “compliant”; any set of briefs that mentioned the old rule only or no rule 
at all were coded as noncompliant. I used this coding system because I was 
most interested in whether the litigants alerted the judge of a rule change. As 
a final step, I gathered information about the relevant judges (seniority, 
magistrate/district, docket loads, etc.).81 
In sum, the analysis below is based on a dataset of (1) seventy-one 
noncompliant decisions; (2) eighty-six compliant decisions; (3) the briefs 
filed in all 157 cases; and (4) judge-specific data. 
III. RESULTS 
This Part develops and tests a series of empirical predictions based on 
the dataset and working variables outlined above. I first offer overall results 
before explaining each variable in turn. 
A. Overall Results 
Table 1 below presents the results of a series of logistic regressions that 
test the effect of the following variables on judicial compliance: whether a 
litigant briefed the (1) new rule or the (2) old rule; (3) magistrate vs. district 
 
 77 See, e.g., Clouser v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, LLC, No. 3:15-33, 2016 WL 4223755, at *2 
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2016); Cathey v. City of Vallejo, No 2:14-cv-017494223755, 2016 WL 792783, at *2 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016); Bird v. Mayhew, No. 1:15-cv-00298-LJO-SAB, 2016 WL 374555, at *1 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 1, 2016). 
 78 See, e.g., Wilson v. TA Operating, LLC, No. 4:14-cv-00771, 2016 WL 4974966, at *1 (M.D. Pa. 
June 14, 2016). 
 79 Search terms: discovery /p proport! /p 26 (1/1/2016-12/31/2016). Although the original results are 
closer to 1116, many of these decisions are unrelated to discovery or use the “reasonably calculated” 
language. 
 80 This collection was done through general search terms in Westlaw. 
 81 At least twenty-eight judges in both the compliant and noncompliant cases appeared multiple times 
in the datasets. 
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judges; (4) length of time between the reforms and the decision; (5) length 
of time between the discovery motion and the decision; (6) docket load of 
district judge; and (7) seniority of district judge. This Essay analyzes each of 
these variables below, but I present the regression results first in order to 
frame the entire analysis. For ease of interpretation, Table 1 presents logit 
coefficients and marginal effects.82 
Table 1 indicates that two factors are correlated with judicial 
compliance: (1) whether litigants briefed the new or old rule; and (2) whether 
a magistrate or district judge decided the case.83 
Prior to exploring these results, a few clarifications and limitations are 
in order. First, the analysis relies on lopsided samples of compliant and 
noncompliant decisions. While I analyzed as many noncompliant decisions 
as I could find (seventy-one), I compared them only to a sample of the 
compliant universe (eighty-six out of 1000). The weighted nature of these 
samples may have an effect on the standard error of the regressions. But the 
odds that the statistical significance results are explained by the lopsidedness 
are small. Second, in order to fully understand the magnitude of the effect, I 
report summary statistics below. Finally, while I attempted to control for 
other variables discussed in the literature, I cannot rule out the possibility of 
unobservable confounding variables that may bias the results. 
B. The Litigant Hypothesis 
As discussed above, the Litigant Hypothesis assumes that judges rely 
extensively on the lawyers’ briefs and are, in many ways, mere deciders 
between two propositions proposed by the parties. Hence, mistakes in the 
briefs should be reflected as mistakes in judicial decisions. If the Litigant 
Hypothesis is right, the following predictions follow: 
Prediction: Compliant briefs should be positively correlated with 
compliant decisions and negatively correlated with noncompliant decisions. 
Prediction: Noncompliant briefs should be positively correlated with 
noncompliant decisions and negatively correlated with compliant decisions. 
In other words, brief compliance should be correlated with judicial 
compliance. By contrast, if the Litigant Hypothesis is wrong, then errant 
briefs have little to no correlation with judicial compliance. 
 
 
 82 As a robustness check, I also ran the regressions on a different sample of cases. 
 83 In running the regression, I was interested in the independent effect of citing the old rule. Table 1 
thus presents results under “Old Rule” for any cases that cited the old rule, even if they also cited the new 
rule. But in most of these cases, the old rule is not cited to show that the discovery rules have been 
updated. Rather, it  is cited as good law by at least one of the briefs. 
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TABLE 1: LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS, ALL VARIABLES84 


















































































N 157 157 157 157 157 36† 42† 157 
Standard errors in brackets. Marginal effects in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5% Level. 
** Significant at the 1% Level. 
†Smaller N accounts for district judges only (and not magistrate judges). See infra Section 
III.C. 
 
Another important point here is that the rule constrains the reach of 
discovery. That means that one side—the side responding to a broad 
discovery request—will always be incentivized to mention the new rule. 
 
 84 One limitation in the data is that I only sampled 157 decisions out of a universe of around 1071. 
This, of course, limits the validity of the conclusions. Moreover, Models 6 and 7 draw only from the 
smaller sample of district judges because most decisions in this context came from magistrate judges. See 
infra Section III.C. 
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There is therefore no reason to believe that noncompliant parties could 
merely be agreeing to litigate under the auspices of the outdated Rule 26. 
In order to test the predictions of the Litigant Hypothesis, I reviewed by 
hand the briefing in the 157 cases in my dataset. I focused on whether any of 
the briefs—including those submitted by petitioners and respondents—
referred to the new or old rules. Specifically, I divided them into two 
categories: (1) briefs that cited the new rule; and (2) briefs that did not cite 
the new rule at all (consisting of briefs that either cited the old rule only or 
no rule at all).85 Table 2 summarizes these findings and details the 
distribution of brief compliance within each subset. 
TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF LITIGANT BEHAVIOR BETWEEN SETS OF DECISIONS86 
 
Briefs Cited New 
Rule 
Briefs Cited Only Old 
Rule or No Rule at All 
Compliant Decisions 67% 33% 
Noncompliant Decisions 35% 65% 
At first blush, “eyeballing” the percentages of litigant citation to the 
rule indicates an important difference. In compliant decisions, approximately 
67% of all briefs mentioned the new rule. By contrast, only around 35% of 
briefs alerted noncompliant judges of a rule change. Models 1–8 in Table 1 
indicate that the effect of briefs citing the new rule on compliance is 
statistically significant. To simplify, the presence of a compliant brief is 
associated with a 32% increase in the probability of a compliant opinion on 
average. Lawyer citations to the old rule also increased the odds of 
noncompliance. This supports the Litigant Hypothesis and suggests an 
important correlation. 
But the data tell a complex story. In a substantial number of compliant 
decisions (33%), the briefs failed to mention the new rule, but the judges 
nonetheless complied. Extrapolating from this sample to the universe of 
1000 compliant decisions, that means at least 333 decisions were associated 
with noncomplicant briefs. Adding this absolute number of noncompliant 
briefs to the forty-six noncompliant briefs in the noncompliant decision 
dataset produces a total of 379 noncompliant briefs out of the 1071 decisions. 
Operating under certain assumptions,87 in that universe of noncompliant 
 
 85 Citing two rules is possible because briefs can cite the new proportionality rule but then define 
relevance by reference to the extinct “reasonably calculated” language. 
 86 These numbers could be further broken down by, for example, cases where the parties cited no 
rule at all or cases where the parties cited both rules. 
 87 Of course, this is based on the assumption that the distribution for the universe of compliant cases 
directly mirrors the distribution for the sample of compliant cases. Since I randomly selected the cases, 
there is no reason to think the sample would be systematically different than the universe. However, there 
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briefs, 88% of judges nonetheless complied.88 That judges complied despite 
errant lawyering emphasizes that most judges are independently aware of the 
new rule. On the other hand, the effect of the Litigant Hypothesis is still 
detectable. In decisions involving compliant briefs, compliance rates 
increased from 88% to 97% 89 of judges and noncompliance decreased from 
12% of decisions to only 3%. These numbers lead to the following 
conclusion: 
Conclusion: Most judges are complying independent of the briefs, but 
a compliant brief is nonetheless associated with a marked increase in 
compliance (and decrease in noncompliance). 
Moreover, the data highlights two other interesting results. First, there 
are a few cases (twenty-five) where the briefs correctly identified the new 
rule, but the judge nonetheless applied the prior standard. This suggests that 
the briefs did not matter at all to these noncompliant judges. These judges 
may have relied on prior orders or archived research as templates. 
Second, in at least 25% of all cases, the briefs cited both the new and 
old rules. This suggests substantial litigant confusion over the changes. As 
mentioned above, most of the cases in this category involved briefs that cited 
the new proportionality rule but then continued to define relevance by 
reference to the outdated “reasonably calculated” language. I coded these 
briefs as “citing the new rule” because I was ultimately concerned with 
whether the litigants alerted the judge to the rule change.90 But this confusion 
between the new and old versions of the rule affected judges too. Out of the 
seventy-one noncompliant decisions in my dataset, a sizable number of them 
involved decisions that cited the “reasonably calculated” language as if it 
were still in effect. But most judges in cases that briefed both rules ultimately 
complied with the new standard. 
In sum, the Litigant Hypothesis seems to have explanatory value. A 
compliant brief is associated with an increase in the probability of a 
compliant decision. But the analysis has important limitations. For example, 
it does not account for the possibility that the judges were informed of the 
new rules during a hearing. Moreover, the difference in brief quality does 
not entirely explain the different results. Other factors may influence these 
decisions. 
 
is, of course, some uncertainty in this estimate that I leave out of the calculation for purposes of this 
Essay. 
 88 The 379 noncompliant briefs were associated with 333 compliant decisions. 
 89 The 621 compliant briefs were associated with 600 compliant decisions. 
 90 Note that many of these briefs that cited the new rule are also included in the “Old Rule” category 
if they did, in fact, also cite the old rule. 
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C. Judicial Characteristics: Magistrate vs. District Judge 
The role of magistrate judges as compared to district court judges could 
also be relevant in this context. These two types of judges face widely 
divergent incentives.91 First, magistrate judges are creatures of Article I 
legislation.92 Although the office has taken on many responsibilities, 
supervision of discovery remains one of its core tasks.93 Unlike district 
judges, the overwhelming majority of the 573 current magistrate judges are 
appointed for “8-year, renewable terms of office.”94 Because magistrate 
judges are not life-tenured, they may be more proactive than district judges 
in an effort to earn reappointment or promotion. 
Second, district judges can reverse or set aside magistrate judge 
discovery decisions.95 This means that magistrate judges face the possibility 
of appellate review. By contrast, district judge discovery decisions generally 
cannot be appealed because they are interlocutory and nondispositive.96 To 
the extent that a discovery decision is appealed after final disposition, it may 
not be found to be outcome-determinative.97 The result is that discovery 
decisions are often de facto not appealable. As Tokson as well as Henderson 
and Hubbard have argued, the presence of appellate oversight may induce 
greater compliance with rules.98 
Finally, magistrate judges are consummate experts in discovery 
proceedings. In 2015, magistrate judges dealt with over 100,000 
nondispositive motions, 55,600 pretrial conferences, and over 10,000 motion 
 
 91 Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 470 
(1998) (“Because the institutional characteristics of courts at different t iers of the court system vary, the 
incentives of judges at the different tiers vary as well.”). 
 92 Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012); Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development 
of the Office of United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4, 
III.1. 
 93 PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 49 (2014) (“In most 
districts, discovery and procedural motions are referred routinely to Magistrate Judges.”). 
 94 Id. at  7. 
 95 FED. R. CIV. P. 72 (authorizing district judges to review dispositive and nondispositive matters 
decided by a magistrate judge). 
 96 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); see also, e.g., Nicholas v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537, 541 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (“Discovery orders are ‘inherently interlocutory’ and typically not appealable.”). 
 97 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2006 (3d ed. 2010) (“A discovery order can always be reviewed on appeal from a final 
judgment in the case, even though it  is often difficult  at  that stage to show that the party has been 
prejudiced by the order, or that the question is not moot, and the harmless-error doctrine, together with 
the broad discretion the discovery rules vest in the trial court, will bar reversal save under very unusual 
circumstances.”). 
 98 See Tokson, supra note 1, at 951; Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S96. 
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hearings.99 While district court judges also handle discovery matters, their 
dockets are more diverse and, in their view, pretrial matters and 
nondispositive motions may be the least interesting or stimulating part of the 
job. Therefore, we might expect greater discovery expertise from magistrate 
judges or at least a much faster learning curve. 
The combination of appellate oversight, exposure and expertise, and 
reappointment/promotion suggests that magistrate judges should comply 
with the new rule more often than district court judges. 
In order to test for the differences between the two types of judges, I 
coded for whether the decisions in the dataset—including compliant and 
noncompliant—were decided by magistrate or district judges. After this first 
step, I was left with 77% of the decisions decided by magistrates and the rest 
by district judges.100 I then analyzed what percentage of each subset 
(magistrate vs. district) were compliant and noncompliant. Table 4 below 
summarizes the relevant data. 
TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF M AGISTRATE AND DISTRICT JUDGES 
 Compliant Noncompliant 
Magistrate Judge 94% 6% 
District Judge 89% 11% 
Magistrate judges complied with the discovery changes in 94% of their 
decisions, while district judges complied in only 89%. Models 3 and 8 of the 
regression analysis detailed in Table 1 indicate that this difference is 
statistically significant controlling for which rule is cited. The 
magistrate/district judge difference is important and suggests that expertise 
and appellate review, among other things, are associated with an increased 
rate of judicial compliance. 
D. Time and Docket Constraints 
Another possible account for noncompliance is that judges and their 
clerks do not have the time or the resources to account for recent legal 
changes, especially subtle changes to federal rules. Time and resource 
constraints may introduce mistakes into the process. 
 
 99 See U.S. Magistrate Judges—Judicial Business 2015, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/us-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-2015 [https://perma.cc/Z68P-LNNB]. 
 100 As explained in further detail in Section III.A, supra, I arrived at these numbers by extrapolating 
from the sample of eighty-six compliant decisions to the universe of compliant decisions. I then added 
the extrapolated number to the number of noncompliant decisions (where I looked at the universe of 
decisions). 
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It is by now well-known that the federal judiciary has faced difficulties 
with expanding dockets. Emphasizing this point, a recent report on judicial 
case management by Judge Edward A. Infante noted that judicial resources 
have not “kept pace with the massive expansion of litigation” over the past 
few years.101 This may give judges less time to devote to each case, leading 
to reliance on heuristics, litigant briefs, and previous cases rather than new 
research. 
Regardless of general time constraints, these concerns have particular 
bite in the context of motion practice where disputes are resolved relatively 
quickly. Judges with congested dockets may have less time to devote to 
motions and may therefore get decisions wrong more often. The number of 
cases in a judicial docket should therefore be correlated with the quality of 
judicial services. More concretely, one possible prediction is that 
noncompliant judges may have more congested dockets—and therefore less 
time per case—than compliant judges. 
In order to test for this possibility, I leveraged a federal database that 
tracks docket congestion for all district judges (and not magistrate judges). 
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse gathers judge-specific 
data on the civil and criminal dockets of Article III judges.102 Using this 
database, I specifically looked at three data points as related to the district 
judges in my noncompliance sets: (1) the number of all cases pending in front 
of the judge; (2) the new number of cases assigned to that judge in 2016; and 
(3) the new number of cases assigned to the judge in 2016 as compared to 
the average in the judge’s district. All three data points should indicate 
whether the average noncompliant district judge had unusually congested 
dockets. I included in Model 6 of the regression only data point (2): the new 
number of cases assigned to that judge last year. Table 5 below provides 
summary statistics, indicating the averages for all compliant and 
noncompliant district court judges in my datasets. 
 
 101 Edward A. Infante, Judicial Case Management in the Federal Trial Courts of the United States 
of America, WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/
FederalCaseMgmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q7C-PWQX]. 
 102  TRAC REPORTS, Civil Cases in District Court (Through September 2016), JUDGE INFORMATION 
CENTER, http://tracfed.syr.edu/judges/interp/civjdglist .html?tracdecor=1 [https://perma.cc/5BJ5-
DBEN]. Magistrate judges are not Article III judges and are therefore not included here. 
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TABLE 5: M ID-2016 CASELOADS FOR COMPLIANT AND NONCOMPLIANT JUDGES 
 Compliant Judges Noncompliant Judges 
Cases Pending 265 205 
New Cases (2016) 267 241 
Compared to District -4.23%  0.78%  
Although there are noticeable disparities, they point in different 
directions. The average compliant judge actually has significantly more, not 
fewer, new and pending cases in their docket. But they do indeed have fewer 
new cases than the average judge in their district. Model 6 in Table 1, 
however, indicates that this disparity is not statistically significant. As a 
whole, these docket differences likely do not account for compliance rates. 
E. Knowledge Constraints: Learning Curve 
A fourth possible account is oriented around judges’ learning curve. As 
Henderson and Hubbard describe, under the Labor Market model, one would 
expect judges to take their time to “learn” about the rules. Compliance should 
steadily increase as knowledge of the Rule 26 amendments disseminates.103 
In order to test the learning account, I ran a regression (Model 4) using 
the number of days since the amendments were adopted as a continuous 
variable. Table 1 indicates no significant relationship. In order to analyze the 
learning curve from a different angle, I also reviewed the number of 
noncompliant decisions per trimester in 2016. If the learning account is right, 
the number of decisions that wrongly quote the defunct language should 
decrease over the year. While the number of noncompliant decisions has 
indeed decreased over the year, the change is not significant. It therefore 
seems unlikely that time since adoption is an important explanation in this 
context. 
F. Judicial Characteristics: Years on the Bench 
One last possible source of disparity in compliance is judicial seniority. 
Habit and status quo bias likely fortify with length of judicial tenure. As 
Henderson and Hubbard note, senior status may be a good “proxy for 
diminished incentive or ability to exert effort to learn” new rules and may be 
positively correlated with noncompliance.104 One limitation of testing length 
of tenure here is that we can only look at the minority of judges who are not 
 
 103 Of course, this prediction only makes sense because there was a consistent distribution of all 
discovery decisions throughout the year. I manually eliminated cases that had a motion pending prior to 
December 1. 
 104 See Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S94. 
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magistrates. Below is the average number of years on the bench for 
compliant and noncompliant district judges. 
TABLE 6. JUDICIAL TENURE OF DISTRICT JUDGES 
 Compliant Judges Noncompliant Judges 
Avg. Number of Years 
on the Bench 
18 17 
> 5 Years 71% 89% 
> 15 Years 57% 39% 
The data does not seem to support a seniority explanation. Not only are 
the means almost the same, Model 7 of Table 1 indicates no statistically 
significant correlation. Indeed, the largest discrepancy—a much higher 
percentage of compliant judges who have been on the bench for more than 
fifteen years—seems to support the opposite conclusion: more experienced 
judges get it right more often. Although the sample size is small because it 
lacks magistrate information, the measure is essentially uncorrelated. 
IV. DISCUSSION: LOW-INFORMATION JUDGING? 
As a whole, the Litigant Hypothesis and magistrate/district judge 
distinction receive support from the data and highlight a possible avenue for 
judicial noncompliance with statutes and rules. One important limitation of 
the study is clear: the results are restricted by the fact that most judges are 
complying with the new discovery standards regardless of briefs. Indeed, the 
more than 93% compliance rates in published discovery decisions is 
impressive compared with Henderson and Hubbard’s less than 14% 
compliance rates in securities cases.105 
Although the Litigant Hypothesis receives support in the data, the 
analysis suggests there may be a broader problem with faulty information 
inputs. We may call this phenomenon “low-information judging” because 
noncompliance results when judges have flawed information sources about 
legal changes. This may explain why judges fail to comply with some rules 
or statutes. Two major findings described above support this: (1) magistrate 
judges—who are discovery specialists—comply at higher rates, which may 
imply a connection between expertise and compliance; and (2) compliant 
 
 105 Id. at S90. There are many likely explanations for this disparity. As an initial matter, discovery is 
a gateway that all civil cases must go through before reaching summary judgment or post-discovery 
settlement. That is not the case for Rule 11 findings that are merely an added gloss in any single case. 
Moreover, the rule that Henderson & Hubbard discuss is not relevant to case outcomes. Again, it  is just 
a procedural nicety. Discovery, on the other hand, can have an outsized effect on lit igation costs and 
outcomes. 
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briefs are positively correlated with compliant decisions. In addition, among 
the only other sources of information for judges (outside of continuing legal 
education or conferences) are judicial clerks. This realization has significant 
consequences. Clerks may also make mistakes in their legal research, 
resulting in a low-information judge. 
While this model emphasizes that low-information judges are starved 
of appropriate epistemic input, these features are not sufficient alone. They 
compound already existing problems. The Labor Market account correctly 
emphasizes the predictable “flaws” that may be introduced into judging. It 
expects judges set in their ways, as well as leisure-maximizing judges who 
do not conduct their own research. These different judging styles may stem 
from many sources, including the judges’ own leisure preferences. Cognitive 
theories, on the other hand, correctly focus on the limits of rationality that 
may influence decisions, including status quo bias. This may explain why 
some judges who faced briefs with the new rules nonetheless applied the old 
rule. 
There are various qualifications to my analysis that point to future 
avenues of research. As an initial matter, the upshot of the findings is that 
judges are complying at impressive rates and much more than lawyers. This 
judge–lawyer disparity is puzzling. Perhaps lawyers are strategically briefing 
the wrong rules or rely on boilerplate discovery motions even more than 
judges do. Moreover, the Rule 26 example indicates that low-information 
judging may apply with particular force in the realm of procedure. As 
explained above, when judges are overworked and underfunded, the 
resulting pressures on time and information compound the need for 
heuristics. Such cognitive quirks apply mostly in areas of routinization, like 
procedural issues.106 Indeed, if judges are attracted to the familiar and 
weighed down by habit, nothing is more routine than procedural doctrines 
that apply in every case. It is precisely in these circumstances of routinization 
that status quo bias is at its strongest.107 This may mean, however, that the 
Litigant Hypothesis findings presented in this study are context-
dependent.108 
In this context, there may be normative reasons to be less concerned 
with judicial noncompliance. Applying defunct precedent merely returns the 
litigants to the pre-amendment equilibrium, which may be inferior but 
nonetheless effective. In the Rule 26 amendment described above, some 
 
 106 Bone, supra note 46, at 1988–89 (explaining how cognitive bias could influence procedural 
decisions). 
 107 See id. A possible omitted variable is ideology. I leave to a future study the possibility that the 
ideology of the judge (conservative or liberal) is a relevant variable in procedural decisions. 
 108 I leave it  to other studies to determine whether this is true or not. 
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courts have failed to apply the proportionality standard, but this has meant a 
mere return to the pre-December 2015 standard. Although clearly at odds 
with the new rules, that standard is at least easy to apply and well-known by 
litigants. In addition, if the Litigant Hypothesis is correct, then the only 
parties negatively affected suffer from a self-inflicted wound.109 It is litigants 
who should improve, especially when it comes to learning about rule 
changes. 
Any quick fixes to the problem of judicial reliance on briefs seem 
unrealistic. Possible avenues of reform, like instituting continuing judicial 
education requirements or increasing the number of federal judges or clerks, 
would be costly and politically unachievable. Other steps might be easier to 
apply, such as imposing mandatory continuing legal education for clerks. 
But there is little reason to think that mistakes can be fully stamped out of 
judging. At most, we should urge judges and clerks to engage in original 
research whenever possible and to cease blind reliance on a judges’ prior on-
point opinions. Another more direct avenue of reform would be to threaten 
lawyers with sanctions or adverse inferences when they fail to cite new 
standards. This approach was recently proposed by Magistrate Judge Peck 
of the Southern District of New York, who berated attorneys in a case for 
failing to adjust discovery responses to the new standards.110 Beyond this 
type of solution, however, other attempts to improve information inputs are 
unlikely to gather sufficient support. 
CONCLUSION 
This study is not designed to provide definitive answers on the Litigant 
Hypothesis; its aim has been to present an initial round of findings that 
indicate that litigants’ briefs may be correlated with levels of judicial 
compliance. Moreover, the study also indicates that magistrate judges seem 
to be better informed about discovery changes than district judges. This 
Essay’s support for the Litigant Hypothesis is a contribution to the wider 
phenomenon of judicial noncompliance and points to future avenues of 






 109 It  is also possible that parties who do not brief the new rule waive its benefits. 
 110 Tera Brostoff, Learn Rule 34 Updates or Face Consequences, Judge Peck Says, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/learn-rule-34-n57982085300 [https://perma.cc/B7QT-
3DPU]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
226 
 
 
